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The Veiled Muslim, the
Anorexic and the
Transsexual
What Do They Have in Common?
Randi Gressgård
UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER
ABSTRACT The Muslim woman wearing the veil, the female anorexic and the
from-male-to-female transsexual constitute three different figures that, despite
their striking differences, have a common symbolic ground. By focusing on the
similarity between the veiled woman and the other two figures, the article sheds
a different light on the debate about the Muslim veil in western societies. It is
argued that the western notion of woman is based on a structural ambivalence of
transcendence and immanence. On the one hand, woman is expected to be liber-
ated, in control and active in public life and in all ways just as free as the man, on
the other she represents a deficiency compared to the man; it is expected of her
that she takes up a complementary, subordinate position in relation to the man.
The subordinate position, however, is seldom pronounced. Officially, the gender
hierarchy is not a part of egalitarian societies, that is, the modern configuration
that formally rejects a hierarchical worldview. Is this the reason why the three
figures are regarded as pathological? Does their way of demonstrating extra-
ordinary transcendence combined with extraordinary immanence make them
monstrous?
KEY WORDS body–spirit dualism ◆ gender construction ◆ hierarchy ◆ modern
ambivalence ◆ the monstrous ◆ symbolic structures
The Muslim woman wearing the veil, the female anorexic and the from-
male-to-female transsexual constitute three different figures that appar-
ently do not have much in common. However, beneath the surface, on the
structural level, a striking similarity is concealed. I approach the structural
homology by asking what is special about these three figures. The
purpose is to shed a different light on the debate about the Muslim veil.
Ever since France suggested a statutory prohibition against religious
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symbols in schools, the debate about the Muslim veil has gained
momentum in western countries.1 What is it about this garment that gives
rise to such ferocious debate and makes democratic states enact statutory
prohibitions against it?
THE TRADITIONAL SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN
The veil is by many associated with a traditional subordination of women.
Several Muslim women, however, and especially those having grown up
in western societies, are of the opinion that the veil liberates them from the
sexualized gaze of men (Jacobsen, 2002; Roald, 2001). The argument is that
the veil conceals the gender and sexual dimensions, and that they there-
fore gain respect as human beings. In this way, in stark contrast to the
arguments of its opponents, the idea of human equality or equal dignity
is attached to the veil.
Regardless of position in the debate, the arguments seem to presuppose
a common symbolic ground: the idea of a division between human
universality and human specificity. On the one hand, it is a matter of an
abstract, universal human being, without any kinds of social particulari-
ties; on the other, it is a matter of concrete human beings, with particular
qualities and attributes, formed by the society and culture of which they
are a part. This structural ambivalence regarding the view on humankind
can be found within different historical epochs within both western and
eastern ways of thinking.
The mere idea of human abstractness and universality constitutes a
typically non-modern figure of thought, attached to the notion of a hier-
archical order. In accordance with Louis Dumont (1970: 239ff.), we may
present the hierarchy as follows: First God creates Adam, the undifferen-
tiated man, the prototype of ‘mankind’. Thereupon he creates Eve from
Adam’s rib as the second sex. Thus Adam and Eve appear as prototypes
of the two sexes. However, due to this operation, Adam has changed
identity; from being undifferentiated, universally human, he has become
a distinct human being – a male. On the other hand, a being has appeared
– woman – who is both a member of the human species and different from
the main representative of this species. Hence, on a first level, man and
woman are identical, whereas on a second level, woman is the contrary of
man and takes up a second, subordinate position.
The subject is universal in the sense of being identical to itself and
anybody else; it is an eternal, undifferentiated, indeterminate, indistinct
absolute – in accordance with a metaphysical ideal of purity or sacred-
ness. The order of society and nature, on the other hand, is earthly,
differentiated and distinct. As soon as Adam and Eve eat from the tree
of life, the world of distinctions is an irrevocable fact. This conception of
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the fall of man from divine grace is an important mythical structure,
informing not only religious narratives, but also western subjectivity in
general and most of the political ideologies (grand narratives) of
western culture.
According to the occidental thought traditions, influenced by the phil-
osophy of classical antiquity and Christianity, the notion of the universal
human being is inextricably linked to the notion of the human spirit, as it
is by virtue of being spiritual, distinct from physical, bodily existence, that
human beings may be imagined as members of the human species. It is,
in other words, because of their spiritual capacity that human beings are
distinguished from the rest of nature. This means that the category
‘human being’, based on the universal identity of the human subject, is
considered within the framework of dualism, e.g. the distinction between
matter and spirit, body and soul, distinctions typical of religion and phil-
osophy in western cultures (Dumont, 1970: 263). A chain of subordination
goes from God to the universal, immortal human spirit and onward from
the spirit to the mortal body. And God, through the spirit, is – as the
creation story indicates – linked to the gender of the subject (Irigaray,
2004: 178), associated more with the man than with the woman. Woman
does not have the same privileged divine filiation as man, since she is
thought of as more hampered by, and subordinated to, limitations associ-
ated with mortal, earthly life and nature in particular.
When universality constitutes the utopian horizon, any specificity will
necessarily appear as a lack to be overcome, insofar as any particular
qualities reveal the gap between the universal, undifferentiated subject
and the autonomous, differentiated subject, or – more specifically –
between the particular cultural identity and a universal civic identity
(Lyotard, 1992: 45). Gender, in particular, is seen as the subject’s failure to
achieve the full identity of (civilized) man (Salecl, cited in Donald, 1996:
186; see also Irigaray, 2004), as woman is seen as subjected to the
immanent, the physical, immediately discernible aspects of being a
human animal (Clack, 2002: 7), which comprise those of the body, the
natural, the bestial, the raw, the wild, etc. (see Butler, 1990; Grosz, 1994;
Lloyd, 1984; Ortner, 1996).
Seen in this way, the distinction between spiritual universality and
bodily distinctness constitutes an essential ambiguity or duality in the
subject, raising the question of how the human subject can be universal
(identical to itself and all others) and specific/autonomous (unique or
different from all others) at the same time. As indicated earlier, modern
ideologies seem to deal with the gap between universality and speci-
ficity/autonomy by incorporating the universal subject – the idea of the
abstract man – into the autonomous male bourgeois subject (e.g. Braidotti,
1991; Mosse, 1985).2 In his capacity of transcending the basic physical facts
of human existence, the autonomous, bourgeois man becomes a whole,
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universal human being, not via a religious, ascetic way of life, but via
culture and intellectual life – in a civilizing process.3
The body, being subjugated to the spirit, acquires a symbolic meaning
through mirroring the spirit. This scheme may translate into the following
motto: ‘a sound mind in a sound body’ (Juvenal’s Satires 10.356), whereas
an impure body – a body showing, for instance, traces of improper behav-
iour – is often considered to bear witness to a bad mind, or a mind that
(temporarily) has lost control over the body (e.g. Norman, 1991). The hier-
archy has become reversed; the body has taken command of the mind.
Against this background, we may – in addition to modern subjectivity
and ideologies – understand religiously motivated traditions of covering
up the female body as well as a number of other practices, such as fasting
and asceticism, related to the body. Often food is associated with desire,
and hence fasting becomes an aspect of asceticism. According to
Annemarie Schimmel (1997: 73), religions characterized by an ascetic
strain operate with more or less negative images of women, because it is
they who symbolize lust and desire.4 It is a general notion – be it secular
or religious – that women are more chaotic and blurred in comparison to
men, and that they need strict boundaries and male control (Økland, 2002:
144).
THE HIERARCHICAL EGALITARIAN ORDER
As pointed out, the symbolic hierarchical structure is not reserved for
other epochs and other cultures; it is also operative – although indirectly
– within contemporary western, egalitarian societies, that is, within the
modern configuration that formally rejects a hierarchical structure
(Dumont, 1996). Hierarchy is embedded in the very heart of the modern,
egalitarian order, insofar as the idea that all human beings are equal is
based on the image of the universal subject, the abstract nakedness of
being nothing but human (Agamben, 1998; Arendt, 1973), in the same
way that Christianity, relating to the notion of the universal human spirit,
above particular bodies, is based on the image of an almighty God
hovering above particular human beings. In that sense, human equality –
following from the conception of all humans as identical when abstracted
from the matter/body – presupposes hierarchy, with man being in
cahoots with the universal human spirit against woman and the body. So,
as long as equality bears on the spirit, in hierarchical opposition to the
body, equality bears on a hierarchical, gendered configuration.
This scheme inevitably manifests itself in a structural ambivalence of
the construction of woman. Simone de Beauvoir (1952), confirming this
symbolic structure, describes the ambivalence as a contradiction between
being human and being feminine. On the one hand, the woman is
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expected to be transcendent (human) on par with the man. This means
that she is expected to be modern, liberated, in control, active in public
life, and in all ways just as free as the man: a free subjectivity defining its
individual projects. On the other hand, the woman represents a deficiency
compared to the man, which associates her to immanence. As an Other it
is expected of her that she is the object for the male subject: that she is
sexually available, that she supports the existing state of affairs connected
to family, kin and private relations; in short, that she possesses a generic
function and takes up a complementary, subordinate position in relation
to the man.
The subordinate position of women, however, is hardly ever
pronounced, and when it is pointed out, it is often justified by reference to
personal solutions or pure love, and it is represented as a result of free
individual choice (Haavind, 1982). One example of women’s structural
ambivalence is found in Lizett U. Skottestad’s (2003) study of women who
have undergone plastic surgery to enlarge their breasts. The study shows
that the women who have gone through cosmetic surgery of this kind
account for their choice by referring to the wish for a visible female facade
that does not decay. At the same time, they desire respect and dignity as
human beings, something that conspicuously big implants exclude
(because big implants make the gender stand out). All the women empha-
size that the choice was entirely their own without pressure from
husbands or fiancés.
Similar reflections are found among women of an immigrant back-
ground in western countries. Several studies show that these women,
often expressing it as ‘maintaining the best of two cultures’, wish to
achieve balance between liberation and subordination. A study by Annick
Prieur (2002: 161ff.) shows that for young immigrant women in Norway
their host country is to be preferred with respect to the public sphere, and
the country of origin as to the private sphere. They appreciate individual
freedom and egalitarian gender relations together with an appreciation of
traditional family life, associated with the authority of their parents and
other elders. (The consideration towards the family implies that the choice
of spouses and the sexual morals of women cannot be a matter of individ-
ual and free personal choice.)
Both examples can be seen as a matter of ambivalence between tran-
scendence and immanence, where transcendence is understood in terms
of liberation, freedom, equality and being in control, while immanence
means subordination, submission and constraint.
The point in question is what happens when freedom and control are
not balanced by submission – when the ambivalence between transcen-
dence and immanence is striking? What happens when some women use
their freedom to choose submission instead, that is, when someone freely
chooses lack of freedom? A first answer is that the choices are not
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accepted by the surrounding world. Questions are raised as to the validity
of the freedom of choice, and the independence of the actors is disputed.
Often it is assumed that they act under the influence of ‘false conscious-
ness’, not knowing their own good, as it were (Gressgård and Jacobsen,
2003).5
A more substantial answer could be that the surrounding world reacts
because the women’s ambivalence appears threatening to the system of
order when it becomes too visible. The ultimate ambivalence, consisting
of complete freedom and control combined with complete submission,
contributes to the demonstration of a gendered hierarchical structure of
supremacy and subordination, and that creates unrest within a cultural
logic founded on a rejection of a hierarchical worldview. Here we are on
the track to the similarity between the Muslim woman wearing the veil,
the female anorexic and the from-male-to-female transsexual.
THE VEILED WOMAN
The idea of the Muslim veil as suppressive of women is well established
in western societies. According to Leila Ahmed (1992: 152), western oppo-
sition to veiled women may be traced back to colonial times. The
discourse on Islam during colonial times indicated that the religion as
such was suppressing women, and that the veil, along with the segrega-
tion of the sexes, contributed to a reinforcement of suppression. The veil
was established as the strongest sign of the inferiority of Muslim
countries. It symbolized both suppression of women and the backward-
ness of Muslim countries, in contrast to the civilized West. (This was the
case in the colonial period despite the fact that the western countries,
England among them, were deeply patriarchal and suppressive of
women, and that Queen Victoria, on many occasions, wore a veil herself.)
Needless to say, this opposition between a liberating West and a
suppressive East structures the recent debates about the veil.6 (The oppo-
sition is operative despite the lack of a basis for claiming that the veil
entails suppression, and that, on the other hand, western societies are just
with respect to gender. The main object of the opposition seems to be the
upholding of an egalitarian self-image.) However, what happens when
Muslim women who are living in western democratic societies use
feminist arguments, emphasize that wearing the veil is liberating, and
insist on their freedom to choose? Given the well-established notion that
the veil is suppressive, Muslim women’s insistence that the veil is liberat-
ing, seems to create major confusion among the majority population. In
order to understand the malaise that the veil arouses, we have to take as
a starting point the western cultural tradition of thought as described
earlier.
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Here it appears that veiled women take the ambivalence of modern
women to its utmost limits. In consonance with the western cultural ideal
of transcendence of immanence towards the abstract human being and
universal equality among humans, Muslim women use arguments of
freedom, control and liberation to explain and legitimize the concealment
of those parts of the body that are assumed to arouse the lust of men. As
they see it, human equality and dignity is accentuated by the liberation
from the sexual gaze of men (e.g. Roald, 2001: 288ff.).7
Seen from a western cultural perspective, however, what happens in
these cases is that transcendence towards a universal human being strikes
back with full force. The reason is that during the process of desexualiz-
ing or disembodying themselves, the women – from a western point of
view – accentuate those bodily attributes supposed to be hidden. As has
been pointed out, in western societies the veil is considered an almost
unambiguous symbol of women’s subordination. At any rate, the veil is
incompatible with the abstract, universal human being. So regardless of
what the veil-wearing woman might herself think, she does not appear as
transcendent, with the universal human subject having been incorporated
into her specificity or autonomy.8 Her gender attributes make transcen-
dence and immanence go hand in hand; control and freedom are accom-
panied by submission. It must also be added that her cultural difference
strengthens the distance to the universal human being, as one can hardly
get further away from the modern bourgeois ideal of man (see Ahmed,
1992). Thus the deficiencies of the Muslim woman, when compared to the
idea of human universality, become overly manifest. It is here that the
malaise arises, because suddenly the veiled Muslim becomes a parody of
the western woman. The decisive point is that the Muslim woman does
not achieve a sufficient balance between liberation and submission the
way most western women do, in order to keep the hierarchical structure
adequately at bay. Instead, she lives it out completely, and lays bare the
symbolic framework of the modern construction of women.
THE FASTING MEDIAEVAL WOMAN AND THE MODERN
ANOREXIC
In her book Den guddommelige anoreksi (Divine Anorexia), Monica Wegling
(2002) compares modern female anorexics with fasting female Christian
mystics of the Middle Ages. Her focus is on the structural homology
between the fasting projects of the two epochs, where she argues that
modern anorexia constitutes a variant of Christian asceticism of premod-
ern times.9 As structural continuity is also my concern, I primarily relate
to her text.
Christian women of the Middle Ages fasted in order to get closer to
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God; it was a matter of becoming one with the Passion of Christ. Accord-
ing to Caroline W. Bynum (1987: 179), the female body was an image for
a God who died to give birth to the world and bled to feed all souls. Moth-
erliness was used as a characterization of the care and love that the soul
received from God, and Jesus was looked upon as a life-giving mother,
which explains why the bleeding wounds of Christ were associated with
food; why Christ was perceived as a mother figure due to bleeding,
feeding and nursing. More generally, it explains why it was possible to
associate the wounds of Christ with the woman’s body and woman with
the Eucharist. The Eucharist served as a reminder of the suffering body of
Christ, and gradually hunger became a preparation for the Lord’s Supper,
insofar as it expressed a hunger or longing for God, but also for the
Passion of Christ. From a perspective such as this, food becomes more
than a symbol, as food really turns into God. To eat God was the same as
becoming the suffering body oneself; it was imitatio Christi (Wegling, 2002:
26). Uli Linke (1999: 137) claims that to eat God was becoming what the
female symbolized: flesh, blood, nurture, suffering and regeneration.
For some female mystics, abstinence and the Eucharist constituted the
essence of religious practice. Those who fasted gained honour and admi-
ration by taking upon themselves the sins of humankind and doing
penance. Also, they were considered particularly strong in the faith
(Wegling, 2002: 22). Femininity, then, was both a means and an end, in
that the worshipping women both chose as their starting point and
became what woman symbolized, above all suffering. The divine was, in
a sense, incorporated into the female body. At the same time, however, the
fast constituted a suppression of the female body and its functions.
Women who through fasting employed their female (bodily) qualities in
order to serve God were said to bleed in a different way and to eject other
kinds of bodily fluids. According to Linke (1999: 145), as part of their
union with God, their behaviours were directed towards shutting off
menstruation, excretion and other ordinary physical functions. Due to the
fact that the body tied the spirit to the earth, and because eating strength-
ened this human connection to the earth, abstinence from food was
regarded as the liberation of the spirit from the things of this world
(Wegling, 2002: 52). In this sense, we may see it as a transcendence of
immanence. However, because it happened to be femininity that was
taken into the service of transcendence, and because the main goal was to
affirm the Passion of Christ through an emphasis on his human/feminine
sides (flesh, blood, nurture, suffering and regeneration), those who fasted
fell back into immanence. For the mediaeval women, therefore, transcen-
dence goes hand in hand with immanence, and both are taken to their
utmost consequence.
Wegling (2002: 176) finds the connection to female anorexics of today in
the ascetic ideal of declining temptations, and in its connection to strength
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and control. She emphasizes that modern anorexia is not only a matter of
the body, but also – as in the Middle Ages – a matter of purification,
purity, conscience and control. Both the modern and the non-modern
fasters have brought moderation out of proportion by wanting to raise
themselves above the limitations imposed by the perishable body. At the
same time, she points out, they are dependent on that very same body to
succeed (Wegling, 2002: 56).
The modern anorexic may triumph at the expense of her surroundings’
addiction to pleasure as long as she does not show any signs of weakness,
that is, as long as she appears controlled and of strong character. But at the
very moment strength disappears, she will – seen from her surroundings
– move from being the incarnation of control to losing it. From being
completely transcendent she has collapsed into immanence.
The modern anorexic’s lack of status is explained by the fact that we
live in a society where enchantment is lost and only logically convincing
arguments are considered viable (Wegling, 2002: 177). Accordingly, the
anorexic is neither understood nor tolerated. (This in contrast to hunger
strikers, who have a worthy cause and rationale of what they do.)
Anorexia-death is without meaning, because we have forgotten its origins
(Wegling, 2002: 182).
As already shown, the mediaeval ascetic emphasized the earthly char-
acter of the body as a means to reach God. The body constituted a physical
obstacle that had to be transcended in order to reach the spiritual world,
but thus it also provided her with the necessary help to get where she
wanted (Wegling, 2002: 184). Because the goals of the mediaeval woman
lay beyond this world, she could die without this representing any
contrast to control and transcendence. In contrast, the modern anorexic
has lost in her attempt of transcendence long before death occurs. She is
not applauded on her way to death, and the reason is that death – and the
way to get there – is associated with loss of control and freedom.
In modern society, eternity is usually not assumed to be achieved
through dying, but by living in certain ways. This is related to the fact that
the undifferentiated, eternal dimension – the universal subject – is incor-
porated into the autonomous, bourgeois man – a specific ideal of manli-
ness. As demonstrated earlier, transcendence is a matter of distancing
oneself from what may be deficient in relation to this ideal, everything
and everybody that mark gaps on the way to perfection. Among these are
found the uncontrolled anorexic woman.
Jorun Solheim’s (1998) analysis of female anorexia draws in the same
direction, although with a different focus (her focus is on the anorexic’s
relationship to her parents). Solheim claims that the anorexic’s fanatical
concern with purity, and the ruthless pursuit of perfection, points towards
the anorexic girl’s exaggerated identification with the image of the father.
She wants to be perfect and pure, as opposed to deficient and impure,
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along the lines of the ideal male condition. In this, Solheim sees an
obvious similarity to the women of the Middle Ages who fasted in order
to get closer to eternity or divinity, in contrast to bodily femininity
(Solheim, 1998: 114ff.). Within the emotional climate of the anorexic, femi-
ninity is a burden; it is heavy and earthly, while she wants to be free.
Solheim states that the anorexic body symbolizes freedom from the
burden of the bodily-determined fate of femininity (Solheim, 1998: 115).
Solheim (1998: 116) also emphasizes another important aspect of
modern anorexia: what may represent liberation to women, may, from a
male point of view, represent a neutralization and undermining of the
strength of women (symbolized by the mighty mother figure). Perceived
this way, modern, female anorexia can be understood as an escape from a
form of sexual dualism that incarnates femininity as body, flesh, food and
mother (cf. the mediaeval image of woman), but which, in its denial of
this image of woman, reproduces the same dualism along the opposite
pole. It raises masculinity to become the ideal. Solheim concludes that in
the last instance, on its most general and fundamental level, the anorexic
message may be read as follows: you shall never be free and perfect, you
may never be yourself in a woman’s body. The more the woman tries to
transcend, it seems, the more her attempts are bound to strike back into
immanence. As the standard for evaluation is defined by a certain male
ideal, the result is given: as ‘different’, one is judged in advance. Any
attempt to live up to the ideal will end up in an accentuation of deficiency.
The fact that transcendence towards universality is incorporated into a
specific entity that constitutes a particular ideal and defines a particular
standard to live up to, makes it hard to catch sight of the underlying meta-
physical notion of totality and hierarchy. Apparently society is based on
egalitarianism, but nevertheless, underneath lies hidden a non-modern,
hierarchical symbolic structure. We may conclude that the anorexic takes
the consequences of living as a woman in such a society. The apprehen-
sion of this, however, implies that we recognize the non-modern configu-
ration on which the hierarchical structure is based, and that is evidently
more than society can bear.
THE TRANSSEXUAL
Concerning liberation, the transsexual who changes from being a man
into becoming a woman goes in the opposite direction to the two other
figures. The project of the transsexual is not liberating in the sense of tran-
scending immanence, but in the sense of transgression – from one sex to
the other. A common trait is that liberation is a matter of becoming
complete as opposed to being divided between body and spirit. Only, in
this case it is a matter of becoming one sex or one gender, and not of
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becoming a human being liberated from bodily attributes. However, as is
the case with the Muslim and the anorexic, here also the hierarchical
division between body and spirit imposes a fundamental symbolic struc-
ture. In the case of transsexuality the division becomes particularly
visible, since the starting point is that the body is to such a small extent in
harmony with the spirit, that it is necessary to carry out dramatic surgical
intervention. Thus the transsexual not only demonstrates the hierarchical
division between body and spirit, but also that the spirit is gendered,
which means that a female spirit demands a female body, and correspond-
ingly, a male spirit demands a male body.
I refer to Tordis Borchgrevink’s (1987) book Kjærlighetens Diktatur.
Kjønn, arbeidsdeling og modernitet (The Dictatorship of Love: Sex, Division
of Labour and Modernity) in order to illuminate what transsexuality can
tell us about the modern configuration, or more precisely, about the
relationship between liberation and submission.
Borchgrevink emphasizes that transsexuality is a matter of creating
oneself as complete, to become self-identical, which implies that the body
is adapted to the spirit. The body is a means for giving the ‘head’ what the
‘head’ legitimately demands, she maintains (Borchgrevink, 1987: 57). In
this sense – of voluntarily altering one’s body – transsexuality comprises
a central aspect of freedom of choice, control, responsibility and intention.
Borchgrevink (1987: 97) finds that transsexuals choose more radically than
most people do.
But what do they choose? According to Borchgrevink, the transsexual
‘person’ ought to be so restlessly engaged in the definition of the sex he or
she wishes to belong to, that the surroundings do not even notice that a
change has occurred (Borchgrevink, 1987: 60). For this reason the trans-
sexual is subjected to a psychiatric examination, before the operation,
during which it is decided whether he or she is able to act convincingly as
the ‘new’ gender, or whether he or she runs the risk of being disclosed.
Borchgrevink (1987: 62) argues that doctors define their success by the
extent to which the transsexual is able to adapt to common gender norms.
With that, we touch upon perhaps the most central aspect of from-male-
to-female transsexuality, because given the narrow needle’s eye, the
person in question has no other choice than to make femininity appear as
convincing as possible, which means living up to a stereotypical gender
role (see Greer, 1999: 65). Borchgrevink (1987: 82) points out that various
studies show that transsexuals’ elaboration of themselves as social
persons is more in accordance with what ‘culture expects’ of men and
women, than what goes for people at large.
There is little doubt that the qualities that are – or have to be – empha-
sized define the women in a subordinate position. Transsexual men
identify themselves as women by being passive, care oriented, emotional
and ‘intuitive’ (Borchgrevink, 1987: 83). Also, occupational preferences
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appear to be unambiguous: secretary, waitress, hairdresser, showbusiness
and so on. (And they seem to have a strong wish for earning less than
men.) Acceptance of and adaptation to the gender-divided labour market
is actually a condition for being recommended for surgery; it is
considered as ‘high motivation’. However, the most highly prioritized
‘occupational preference’ is that of housewife (married, being provided
for, at home) (Borchgrevink, 1987: 84–5). The clinics even offer education
in living as the opposite sex, where it is taught how to make up, how to
dress properly, how to walk and sit properly, and correct intercourse posi-
tions (Borchgrevink, 1987: 87). In this way, bordering on caricature, trans-
sexuals are prepared for reproducing the symbolic pattern of gender roles.
Borchgrevink’s material reveals that for the sex operated, freedom of
choice and liberation goes hand in hand with submission and confine-
ment. Like the Muslim and the anorexic, the transsexual makes a choice
that contributes to marking the hierarchical inequality between masculin-
ity and femininity. Just as explicitly as the others, if not more, the trans-
sexual demonstrates that femininity is complementary to masculinity, and
that femininity implies submission. The ‘fact’ that women are doomed to
live in immanence is confirmed, and that is not only because of the body,
but most of all because of the spirit. The hierarchy is both the source and
the result of transsexuality.
We may say that, as with the two other figures, the transsexual uses
freedom of choice to choose submission. There is, however, a significant
difference here, because in this case we can attach choice and control
directly to masculinity (before the operation) and submission directly to
femininity (after the operation). Hence, the connection between masculin-
ity and transcendence and femininity and immanence becomes exception-
ally clear. The transsexual demonstrates an extraordinary transcendence
combined with an extraordinary immanence.
THE MONSTROUS
In each way, the Muslim wearing the veil, the female anorexic and the
from-man-to-woman transsexual demonstrate a structural ambivalence of
transcendence and immanence attached to the notion of woman, within a
hierarchical order. And with that, the three figures make visible the hier-
archy on which the modern, egalitarian understanding of society is based,
and thereby strike the society where it is most vulnerable.
We may say that their demonstrative character makes the three figures
monstrous, if we look at Latin meaning of the word. Monster/monstrum
is primarily an object of display, according to Rosi Braidotti (1994, 1996).
She points out that the monster de-monstrates God’s will, and monstrum
can be associated with moneo, which means to warn. Furthermore, the
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monster is always ambivalent in that it evokes both horror and fascina-
tion, and finally, the monster is associated with excess, lack and displace-
ment in relation to something else, namely the normal human being. In
that sense, the monster is in a liminal position, contributing to uphold the
dominant view of subjectivity.
The monstrous can be seen as effects of, and constitutive of, certain
discursive practices directed at re-establishing balance and recreating
order by returning the monster figures to the fold. It happens by turning
them into pathologies, which explains why the three figures, in respective
ways, are turned into victims and thereby cut off from freedom of choice
and control. In the first case it occurs through an ‘us–them’ discourse,
where the veiled woman is ascribed the role as an Other in a cultural
sense, while attention is diverted from the dominant cultural order. In the
second case, it occurs through a ‘healthy–sick’ discourse, where the
anorexic woman is given a diagnosis, while the surrounding society is
given a clean bill of health. In the third case, we witness a
‘normal–deviant’ discourse, where the transsexual is constituted as
deviant in a psychiatric sense, while the normality of the surrounding
society is affirmed (see Sirnes, 1999; Solvang, 2000). But despite all
attempts to control the abnormal, it will not disappear, insofar as it is
constituted by, and constitutive of, normality. As Braidotti (1996: 150)
makes clear, the monster is always going to get us.
NOTES
I would like to thank Henrik Kjærum for his careful work on the translation, and
Cathrine Egeland, Yngve Lithman, Christine Jacobsen and the two referees for
their valuable comments.
1. The debate about the Muslim veil (hijab) started in France in 1989, when
three girls were expelled from a school in Creil outside Paris, after refusing
to unveil. But the debate is not confined to France. It takes place in many
countries, and it has a long history, as is elaborated in the text.
2. The gap is to be overcome by a civilizing process oriented towards universal
subjectivity as the basis for an inclusive humanity. Thus modern ideologies,
like the liberal and republican, are oriented towards a utopian goal that does
not allow any autonomy (since the goal is indistinct or undifferentiated).
This is only half the truth, however, because, as indicated, the ideal of
universality does not require autonomy as such to be eliminated, as long as
the autonomous citizen is the object of the civilizing process. Autonomy is
both the starting point and the end; as starting point autonomy is uncivi-
lized, as an end it is civilized (Gressgård, 2002). Only the civilized (male)
autonomous subject can possess or display the attributes required of the
equal human being, the mature citizen (see Arendt, 1973: 300–2; Dean, 1999:
134–5, 146), and as an ideal human being, he sets the standards for civiliz-
ation. It is, in other words, the incorporation of the universal subject into the
autonomous subject that makes it possible for a certain culture to represent
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humanity as a whole. Along these lines, Dumont (1996) notes that the
German nation becomes the exemplary example of humanity, a perfect
incorporation of a universal idea. His reference is the political philosopher
Fichte, who adopts the current stereotypes of the excellence of the German
character in order to state a hierarchy among peoples in the name of the very
value of universalism (Dumont, 1996: 123). In Dumont’s subsequent
comparison of German and French ideology, he concludes that the Germans
saw themselves as superior qua Germans, while the French consciously
postulated only the superiority of the universalist culture, but identified
with it so naively that they looked on themselves as the educators of
mankind (Dumont, 1996: 131; see also Barthes, 1973).
3. It is particularly the Kantian philosophical tradition that is associated with
‘secular’ transcendence, where the human spiritual, intelligible world
stands in contrast to the physical world’s causal relations, and this opposi-
tion corresponds to the moral distinction between duty and inclination.
Duty denotes freedom, and is achieved by controlling one’s bodily impulses
and preferences, with our actions being directed towards higher ideals and
values. This is a modern, idealist concept of freedom. But the need for
distancing oneself from the animal aspects of life can also be found in the
philosophy of Plato, and later Augustin, where the life of the mind is prior-
itized over physical existence. This idea has influence the whole western
way of thinking, including modern, existentialist thought, in which the
human being is considered to have a desire to transcend features associated
with nature. In de Beauvoir’s (1952) philosophy, transcendence is linked to
progression, and expresses (male) individual subjectivity. The male’s
vocation is to transcend towards the totality of the universe and the infinity
of the future (Lyotard, 1992: 37). Immanence, on the other hand, is linked to
maintenance and cyclical time, in the sense of sustaining life, and these
(female) activities cannot express individuality (de Beauvoir, 1952). In
Sartre’s thought human beings have the ability to transcend physical
placing; they have the freedom to shape their lives and thoughts (Clack,
2002: 6). This concept of freedom of choice is reflected in later sociology of
reflexivity (i.e. Giddens, Beck). Classical liberalism (i.e. Hobbes, Locke,
Hume) can also be seen as directed towards transcendence, in the sense of
liberation from hindrances or constraints. To the extent that man is
prevented from doing that he has a will to do, he is not free. This ‘negative’
concept of freedom is constitutive of most democratic political models in the
West.
4. Christian asceticism is often understood as if relinquishing oneself implies
relinquishing the body for the benefit of the spirit. This, according to Halvor
Moxnes (2002), is a misunderstanding. The problem is not the body as such;
asceticism is primarily directed against desire: ‘It is desire that drives men
to sexual activities that create bodily unions with prostitutes (1 Corinthians,
6), and thus connect them to the godless world. The alternative is not a
disembodied existence, but to become “one with Christ in body”’ (Moxnes,
2002: 64). Furthermore Moxnes argues that the sign of the bodily union with
Christ is the Spirit thence becoming a bodily phenomenon: ‘The spirit lives
in man (Rom. 8.9–11; Corinthians 6.19) . . . This Paul contrasts to sin, “flesh”,
“evil nature”, or “desire” (Rom. 8.12; Gal. 5.16–18), and these parties, so to
speak, are in conflict forming the bodily and social life of mankind’
(Moxnes, 2002: 65). I return to the relation between the human body and
Christ later in the article, where the theme of female anorexics is discussed.
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5. For instance, Susan M. Okin (1999) points to a series of cultural practices
and ideologies connected to gender that is directed towards controlling
women and making them into slaves for men’s interest and desires (here
among, wearing the veil). Women who endorse such practices are presented
as victims of some kind of false consciousness, not knowing their own good.
Okin does not, however, base her argument on Marx’s expressive material-
ist concept of freedom, in contrast to alienation, nor does she relate to the
existentialist concept of freedom of choice, in contrast to bad faith. Her
argument is predominantly liberal, directed against constrained choices.
6. A main argument against the veil is that it suppresses women by being an
expression of a patriarchal culture, in contrast to the egalitarian culture of
the West. In many cases, the debates seem to be informed by the idea of the
clash of civilizations (Huntington).
7. This is, of course, only one way of understanding the Muslim veil. Never-
theless, it represents a widespread opinion among Muslims living in
western societies (Roald, 2001).
8. Also, Muslim traditions provide the man with a prior right to transcendence
of materialism towards eternity or divinity. As is the case with Christianity,
the woman within most Islamic traditions is looked upon as incomplete in
comparison to the man. An exception is found within Islamic mysticism,
Sufism, where women may manifest the divine, although in some cases they
are characterized as men encased in female bodies. It is just as likely,
however, that due to her sex, the woman may personify evil (Schimmel,
1997). A parallel is found in the mediaeval mysticism of Christianity. This I
return to, when looking at female anorexics.
9. See also among others Bell (1985), Bell and Mazzoni (2003), Mazzoni (1996)
and Vandereycken and van Deth (1994).
REFERENCES
Agamben, G. (1998) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Ahmed, L. (1992) Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of Modern Debate.
New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press.
Arendt, H. (1973) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harvest Book.
Barthes, R. (1973) Mythologies. London: Paladin.
Bell, R.M. (1985) Holy Anorexia. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Bell, R.M. and C. Mazzoni (2003) The Voices of Gemma Galgani: The Life and Afterlife
of a Modern Saint. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Borchgrevink, T. (1987) Kjærlighetens Diktatur. Kjønn, arbeidsdeling og modernitet
[The Dictatorship of Love: Sex, Division of Labour and Modernity],
Occasional Papers in Social Anthropology No. 21. Oslo: University of Oslo.
Braidotti, R. (1991) Patterns of Dissonance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Braidotti, R. (1994) Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contem-
porary Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University Press.
Braidotti, R. (1996) ‘Signs of Wonder and Traces of Doubt: On Teratology and
Embodied Differences’, pp. 135–52 in N. Lykke and R. Braidotti (eds)
Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist Confrontations with Science,
Medicine and Cyberspace. London and New York: Zed Books.
Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble. New York and London: Routledge.
Gressgård: The Veiled Muslim, the Anorexic and the Transsexual 339
Bynum, C.W. (1987) Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food for
Medieval Women. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Clack, B. (2002) Sex and Death: A Reappraisal of Human Mortality. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Dean, M. (1999) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London,
Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage.
De Beauvoir, S. (1952) The Second Sex. New York: Random House.
Donald, J. (1996) ‘The Citizen and the Man About Town’, pp. 170–90 in S. Hall and
P. du Gay (eds) Questions of Cultural Identity. London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi: Sage.
Dumont, L. (1970) Homo Hierachicus: The Caste System and Its Implications. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Dumont, L. (1996) Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological
Perspective. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Greer, G. (1999) The Whole Woman. London: Doubleday.
Gressgård, R. (2002) ‘Dilemmaet mellom likeverdighet og særegenhet som ramme
for flerkulturell dialog’ [The Dilemma between Equal Dignity and Speci-
ficity as Structural Framework for Multicultural Dialogue], Dr.polit. thesis.
University of Bergen.
Gressgård, Randi and Christine Jacobsen (2003) ‘Questions of Gender in a Multi-
cultural Society’, Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies (NORA) 11(2): 69–77.
Grosz, E. (1994) Volatile Bodies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Haavind, H. (1982) ‘Makt og kjærlighet i ekteskapet’ [Power and Love in
Marriage], pp. 138–71 in R. Haukaa, M. Hoel and H. Haavind (eds) Kvin-
neforskning: Bidrag til samfunnsteori [Gender Research: Contributions to
Social Theory]. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Irigaray, L. (2004) Key Writings. London: Continuum.
Jacobsen, C. (2002) Tilhørighetens mange former. Unge Muslimer i Norge [The Many
Forms of Belonging: Young Muslims in Norway]. Oslo: UniPax.
Linke, U. (1999) Blood and Nation: The European Aesthetics of Race. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Lloyd, G. (1984) The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy.
London: Methuen.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1992) The Postmodern Explained to Children. London: Turnaround.
Mazzoni, C. (1996) Saint Hysteria: Neurosis, Mysticism, and Gender in European
Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mosse, G.L. (1985) Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual
Norms in Modern Europe. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Moxnes, H. (2002) ‘Mannens begjær som moralsk problem. Foucault og Paulus om
formingen av subjektet i antikken’ [Male Desire as a Moral Problem:
Foucault and Paul on the Formation of the Ancient Subject], pp. 25–72 in H.
Moxnes, J. Børtnes and D.E. Ensjø (eds) Naturlig sex? Seksualitet og kjønn i den
kristne antikken [Natural Sex? Sexuality and Gender in the Christian
Antiquity]. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
Norman, K. (1991) A Sound Family Makes a Sound State: Ideology and Upbringing in
a German Village, Studies in Social Anthropology No. 24. Stockholm:
University of Stockholm.
Okin, S.M. (1999) ‘Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?’, pp. 7–26 in C. Joshua and
H. Matthew (eds) Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Økland, J. (2002) ‘Intet nytt under Kristus. En dialog med Bernadette Brooten om
kvinners “unaturlige” begjær i antikken’ [Nothing New under Christ. A
European Journal of Women’s Studies 13(4)340
Dialogue with Bernadette Brooten on Women’s ‘Unnatural’ Desires in
Antiquity], pp. 129–73 in H. Moxnes, J. Børtnes and D.E. Endsjø (eds)
Naturlig sex? Seksualitet og kjønn i den kristne antikken [Natural Sex? Sexuality
and Gender in the Christian Antiquity]. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
Ortner, S.B. (1996) Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture. Boston, MA:
Bacon Press.
Prieur, A. (2002) ‘Magt over eget liv: om unge indvandrere, patriarkalske fami-
lieformer og nordiske ligestillingsidealer’ [Control Over One’s Own Life:
About Young Immigrants, Partriarchical Family Forms and Nordic Ideals Of
Gender Equality], pp. 149–67 in A. Borchorst (ed.) Kønsmagt under forandring
[Shifting Power of Gender]. Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag.
Roald, A.S. (2001) Women in Islam: The Western Experience. New York and London:
Routledge.
Schimmel, A. (1997) My Soul is a Woman: The Feminine in Islam. New York and
London: Continuum.
Sirnes, T. (1999) ‘“Alt som er fast, fordamper?” Normalitet og identitet i endring’
[All that is Solid Melts into Air: Transformation of Normality and Identity],
pp. 29–75 in S. Meyer and T. Sirnes (eds) Normalitet og identitetsmakt i Norge
[Normality and the Power of Identity in Norway]. Oslo: Ad Notam
Gyldendal.
Skottestad, L.U. (2003) ‘Balansekunst: En analyse av hvordan en gruppe kvinner
og kirurger redegjør for valg av brystforstørrelse’ [A Fine Balance: An
Analysis of a How a Group of Women and Surgeons Account for the Choice
of Breast Enlargement], master’s thesis, University of Tromsø.
Solheim, J. (1998) Den åpne kroppen. Om kjønnssymbolikk i moderne kultur [The Open
Body: Gender Symbolism in Modern Culture]. Oslo: Pax.
Solvang, P. (2000) ‘The Emergence of an Us and Them Discourse in Disability
Theory’, Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research 2(1): 3–19.
Vandereycken, W. and R. van Deth (1994) From Fasting Saints to Anorexic Girls: The
History of Self-Starvation. London: Athlone.
Wegling, M. (2002) Den guddommelige anoreksi [Divine Anorexia]. Oslo:
Aschehoug.
Randi Gressgård is an associate professor in sociology at the University of Stavanger,
Norway. She is also a researcher in the field of international migration and ethnic
relations (IMER). Her doctoral thesis (2002) dealt with the multicultural dilemma
between equal dignity and cultural specificity, and is now being prepared for
international publication. Her recent research focuses on the intersection
between nation, gender and sexuality. Address: Department of Media,
Culture and Society, University of Stavanger, N-4036 Stavanger, Norway. [email:
randi.gressgard@uis.no]
◆
Gressgård: The Veiled Muslim, the Anorexic and the Transsexual 341
